---
title: "Audit logging and hooks"
output: rmarkdown::html_vignette
vignette: >
  %\VignetteIndexEntry{Audit logging and hooks}
  %\VignetteEngine{knitr::rmarkdown}
  %\VignetteEncoding{UTF-8}
---

## Overview

'shinyOAuth' emits structured audit events as the OAuth 2.0/OIDC flow runs.
These events can help you understand what happened during login and spot
problems such as repeated failures, replay attempts, or configuration issues.

This vignette covers:

- How to register audit hooks to export/store events
- Some options for controlling the content of events
- Which audit events are emitted & what fields are included in each event

## Receiving audit events

You can use `options(shinyOAuth.audit_hook = function(event) { ... })` to register a
hook function that will be called whenever 'shinyOAuth' emits a structured audit
or error event. Keep this function fast, non-blocking, and safe: it should not
throw errors.

Example of printing audit events to console:
```r
options(shinyOAuth.audit_hook = function(event) {
	cat(sprintf("[AUDIT] %s %s\n", event$type, event$trace_id))
	str(event)
})
```

Another way that 'shinyOAuth' can emit audit events is via OpenTelemetry logging.
Please see `vignette("opentelemetry", package = "shinyOAuth")` for more details.

## Event structure

All audit events share the following base shape:

- `type`: a string starting with `audit_...`
- `trace_id`: a short correlation id for linking related records from the same
  operation or auth flow
- `timestamp`: POSIXct time when the event was created (from `Sys.time()`)
- Additional key/value fields depending on the event (see event catalog)

For the interactive login flow, 'shinyOAuth' propagates the same `trace_id`
from redirect preparation through callback validation, token exchange, and
login success or failure handling. The trace id is stored inside the sealed
state so it survives the browser round-trip without exposing raw OAuth values.

This `trace_id` is the application-level correlation id used by 'shinyOAuth'. When OTel
logging is enabled it is exported as the `shinyoauth.trace_id` log attribute.
It is separate from any trace/span ids created by your OpenTelemetry backend.

When events are emitted from within a Shiny session, a JSON-friendly `shiny_session` list
is attached to every event so you can tie the audit record back to the app
session and HTTP request. The structure is designed to serialize cleanly with
`jsonlite::toJSON()`:

- `shiny_session$token`: the Shiny per-session token (`session$token`) when available.
- `shiny_session$is_async`: `FALSE` for events emitted from the main R process
	and `TRUE` for events emitted from an async worker. This helps distinguish
	background work such as async token exchange or refresh from the main
	reactive flow.
- If you pre-capture worker context with `capture_shiny_session_context(is_async = TRUE)`
	but emit the event before any worker work actually starts, 'shinyOAuth' resets
	that borrowed context back to `FALSE` because the event still came from the
	main process.
- `shiny_session$process_id`: the process ID (PID) of the R process that emitted the event.
- `shiny_session$main_process_id`: (async events only) the PID of the main R process that spawned the async worker. This allows you to correlate events from workers back to the originating main process.
- `mirai_error_type`: a top-level event field present only on async failure variants of `login_failed`, `session_cleared`, and `refresh_failed_but_kept_session`. It classifies mirai transport-level failures separately from application-level errors. When present:
  - `"mirai_error"` — code threw an R error inside the worker
  - `"mirai_timeout"` — the task exceeded its timeout and was cancelled by dispatcher
  - `"mirai_connection_reset"` — the daemon process crashed or was terminated
  - `"mirai_interrupt"` — the task was interrupted/cancelled via `stop_mirai()`
  - `NA` — not a mirai-specific error (e.g., sync path or future backend)
- `shiny_session$http`: a compact HTTP summary with fields:
	- `method`, `path`, `query_string`, `host`, `scheme`, `remote_addr`
	- `headers`: a list of request headers derived from `HTTP_*` environment variables, with lowercase names (e.g., `user_agent`).

With the default `options(shinyOAuth.audit_redact_http = TRUE)`, `remote_addr` is replaced with `[REDACTED]` before the event is emitted.

Note: the raw `session$request` from Shiny is not included to keep the event JSON-serializable and concise.

### HTTP context sanitization

For safety, the `shiny_session$http` summary is automatically sanitized before being attached to events.
This prevents accidental secret leakage when forwarding events to log sinks:

- OAuth query parameters are redacted: callback credentials such as `code`, `state`, `access_token`, `refresh_token`, `id_token`, `token`, `session_state`, `code_verifier`, and `nonce`, plus credential-bearing token-endpoint parameters such as `client_secret`, `client_assertion`, `assertion`, `username`, and `password`, are replaced with `[REDACTED]`.
- Sensitive headers are removed: `Cookie`, `Set-Cookie`, `Authorization`, `Proxy_Authorization`,
`Proxy_Authenticate`, and `WWW-Authenticate` headers are stripped entirely.
- Proxy headers are redacted: headers starting with `x_` (e.g., `x_forwarded_for`, `x_real_ip`) are replaced with `[REDACTED]` to avoid leaking internal infrastructure details.
- Client IP addresses are redacted: `remote_addr` is replaced with `[REDACTED]` while HTTP redaction stays enabled.

This means you can safely forward the `shiny_session$http` object to external logging systems
without manually stripping secrets.

If you need the raw, unsanitized HTTP context in audit events for local debugging, you can disable redaction temporarily:

```r
options(shinyOAuth.audit_redact_http = FALSE)
```

Do not use this in production log sinks. Raw mode can expose authorization codes,
state values, cookies, authorization headers, client assertions, and client IP addresses.

### Excluding HTTP context entirely

To completely exclude HTTP request details from audit events:

```r
options(shinyOAuth.audit_include_http = FALSE)
```

This means that the `shiny_session$http` field will be `NULL` in all audit events.

### Audit events from async workers (mirai daemons)

When `async = TRUE` is configured in `oauth_module_server()`, token exchange,
refresh, and revocation run through the async dispatch layer in 'shinyOAuth'. With
mirai daemons and future multisession plans this means background worker
processes; with `future::sequential` the code stays in-process but still uses
the async promise path. The package automatically propagates your
`shinyOAuth.audit_hook` option to these async executions, so audit events fire
there as well. For async work managed by 'shinyOAuth', the package also replays the
parent session's relevant `OTEL_*` / `OTEL_R_*` environment variables inside
the async execution context so exporter configuration stays aligned with the
main R process. It also propagates the effective
`shinyOAuth.otel_tracing_enabled` and `shinyOAuth.otel_logging_enabled` option
gates so reused workers do not keep stale telemetry-disabled state from an
earlier task.

Note that your audit hook function (and any objects referenced in
its closure) must be serializable. If your hook writes to a database connection,
file handle, or other non-serializable resource, it will fail in the
worker process and 'shinyOAuth' will surface that failure as a warning
(captured and replayed to the main process when using async workers). Use hooks that create connections on demand (e.g., open a
database connection inside the hook body) rather than capturing an existing
connection in the closure.

Also note that in true async mode a worker cannot mutate the main R process's
in-memory objects. Patterns like appending to a global list or incrementing a
counter inside `audit_hook` only affect the worker's private copy. For
cross-process delivery, write to an external sink (database, file, queue, OTLP
exporter, etc.) or explicitly return captured data from the worker in tests.

### Digest fields and keying

Many audit events include digest fields such as `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`,
`code_digest`, `browser_token_digest`, and `sub_digest`. These let you connect
related events without logging the raw sensitive values themselves.

By default, these digests use HMAC-SHA256 with an auto-generated per-process key.
If you do not configure `options(shinyOAuth.audit_digest_key = ...)`, each R
process gets its own random key at runtime. That makes accidental cross-process
matching harder if logs leak, but it also means digests are not stable across
unrelated processes by default.

For async work managed by 'shinyOAuth', the package propagates the effective digest
key into its workers so main-process and worker events from the same app
instance remain comparable. If you need digests to stay comparable across
multiple app processes or separate R sessions, configure a shared key.

If you run multiple workers/processes and want digests to be comparable across them,
configure a shared key:

```r
options(shinyOAuth.audit_digest_key = Sys.getenv("AUDIT_DIGEST_KEY"))
```

To disable keying (legacy deterministic SHA-256 digests):

```r
options(shinyOAuth.audit_digest_key = FALSE)
```

Note: unkeyed digests are easier to compare across systems, but they are also
easier to guess for low-entropy values such as email addresses.

## Event catalog

### Authorization redirect issuance

#### Event: `audit_redirect_issued`

- When: after `prepare_call()` builds the authorization URL
- Context:

	- `provider`, `issuer`
	- `client_id_digest`
	- `state_digest`
	- `browser_token_digest`
	- `pkce_method` (e.g., `S256`, `plain`, or `NA`)
	- `par_used` (logical)
	- `request_object_used` (logical)
	- `nonce_present` (logical)
	- `scopes_count`
	- `redirect_uri`

### Callback query rejected

#### Event: `audit_callback_query_rejected`

- When: the callback query parameters fail validation (e.g., too large)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `error_class`
- For form_post bridge query rejections, context also includes `phase`, `reason`, and `handle_digest`.

### Callback issuer validation

#### Event: `audit_callback_iss_missing`

- When: `enforce_callback_issuer = TRUE` and the callback omits the RFC 9207 `iss` parameter
- Context: `provider`, `expected_issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `error_class`

#### Event: `audit_callback_iss_mismatch`

- When: the callback includes an `iss` query parameter (per RFC 9207) that does not match the provider's expected issuer
- Context: `provider`, `expected_issuer`, `callback_issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `error_class`

#### Event: `audit_callback_iss_validation_failed`

- When: callback issuer validation fails before token exchange for a reason other than the dedicated missing/mismatch cases above
- Context: `provider`, `expected_issuer`, `callback_issuer` (when present), `client_id_digest`, `error_class`

### Callback received

#### Event: `audit_callback_received`

- When: after the sealed `state` payload has been decrypted and validated (or prevalidated on the main process for async callback handling), just before state-store consumption and the later browser-token/PKCE/nonce checks
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `code_digest`, `state_digest`, `browser_token_digest`
- Notes: callbacks that fail before payload validation do not emit this event

### Callback validation

Callback validation covers both the sealed-state checks and the later checks of
the values tied to that state, such as the browser token, PKCE code verifier,
and nonce. Each stage emits either a success event or a failure event.

#### Event: `audit_callback_validation_success`

- When: the encrypted `state` payload has been decrypted and verified for freshness and client/provider binding (emitted from `state_payload_decrypt_validate()`)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`

#### Event: `audit_callback_validation_failed`

- When: a validation step fails prior to token exchange
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`, `phase`, `error_class` (+ `browser_token_digest` when phase is `browser_token_validation`)
- Phases include: `payload_validation`, `browser_token_validation`, `pkce_verifier_validation`, `nonce_validation`, `form_post_request_validation`, `form_post_callback_lookup`
- `handle_digest` is included when a form_post callback handle is missing, expired, or already consumed.
- Note: Failures related to state store access (lookup/removal) are reported as their own events (see below) rather than using the `callback_validation_failed` event.

### State store access

State retrieval and removal of the single-use state entry are emitted as separate events by `state_store_get_remove()`.

#### Event: `audit_state_store_lookup_failed`

- When: retrieving the single-use state entry from the configured `state_store` fails (missing, malformed, or underlying cache error)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`, `error_class`, `phase` (`state_store_lookup` or `state_store_atomic_take`)
- Notes: The flow aborts with an invalid state error. The `state_store_atomic_take` phase applies when using a store with an atomic `$take()` method.

#### Event: `audit_state_store_removal_failed`

- When: removal of the single-use state entry (enforcing one-time use) fails
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`, `error_class`, `phase` (`state_store_removal`)
- Notes: A failure to remove also aborts the flow with an invalid state error; the event is emitted best-effort and will never itself throw.

Digest differences: For `audit_callback_validation_failed` during payload decryption (`phase = "payload_validation"`) the `state_digest` is computed from the encrypted payload (plaintext not yet available). For state store events the digest reflects the plaintext state string.

### Token exchange

#### Event: `audit_token_exchange`

- When: authorization code successfully exchanged for tokens
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `code_digest`, `used_pkce`, `received_id_token`, `received_refresh_token`, `expires_in_synthesized`
- `expires_in_synthesized` (logical): `TRUE` when the token response did not include a usable `expires_in` value and the package fell back to `resolve_missing_expires_in()`

#### Event: `audit_token_exchange_error`

- When: token exchange fails
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `code_digest`, `error_class`

Detailed sender-constraint diagnostics such as DPoP token-type inference,
DPoP nonce retries, and mTLS endpoint-alias selection are emitted on the
OpenTelemetry spans documented in `vignette("opentelemetry")` rather than on
the high-level audit events.

### Token introspection

#### Event: `audit_token_introspection`

- When: `introspect_token()` reaches a final result (for example during login or refresh when `introspect = TRUE`)
- Context:
	- `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`
	- `which` ("access" or "refresh")
	- `supported` (logical), `active` (logical|NA), `status`
	- `sub_digest`, `introspected_client_id_digest`, `scope_digest` (when available)
- `status` values include `"ok"`, `"introspection_unsupported"`, `"missing_token"`, `"body_too_large"`, `"invalid_json"`, `"missing_active"`, `"invalid_active"`, and `"http_<code>"`

### Login result

#### Event: `audit_login_success`

- When: token set is verified and an `OAuthToken` is created
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `sub_digest`, `sub_source`, `refresh_token_present`, `expires_at`

`sub_source` indicates where `sub_digest` was derived from:

- `userinfo`: subject came from the userinfo response
- `id_token`: subject came from an ID token that was validated (signature + claims)
- `id_token_unverified`: subject came from an ID token payload parse when ID token validation was not performed

#### Event: `audit_login_failed`

- When: surface-level login failure during callback handling in the Shiny module
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `phase`, `error_class`, `mirai_error_type`
- `phase` currently includes:
  - `sync_token_exchange`
  - `async_token_exchange`
  - `async_payload_validation`
  - `async_state_store_lookup`
- `mirai_error_type` is only present on async failure paths

### Logout and session clears

#### Event: `audit_logout`

- When: `values$logout()` is called on the module
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `reason` (default `manual_logout`)

#### Event: `audit_session_cleared`

- When: the module clears the token reactively
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `reason`, `error_class`, `mirai_error_type`
- Reasons include: `refresh_failed_async`, `refresh_failed_sync`, `reauth_window`, `token_expired`
- Note: `error_class` is present on refresh failure reasons (`refresh_failed_async`, `refresh_failed_sync`) but absent for `reauth_window` and `token_expired`; `mirai_error_type` is only present for async refresh-failure clears

### Token revocation

#### Event: `audit_token_revocation`

- When: `revoke_token()` reaches a final outcome (including early `unsupported` or `missing_token` returns) during logout or session end
- Context:
	- `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`
	- `which` ("access" or "refresh")
	- `supported` (logical), `revoked` (logical|NA), `status`
- `status` values include `"ok"`, `"revocation_unsupported"`, `"missing_token"`, and `"http_<code>"`

### Refresh failures while keeping the session (indefinite sessions)

#### Event: `audit_refresh_failed_but_kept_session`

- When: a token refresh attempt fails but the module is configured not to clear the session (i.e., `indefinite_session = TRUE` in `oauth_module_server()`)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `reason` (`refresh_failed_async`|`refresh_failed_sync`), `kept_token` (TRUE), `error_class`, `mirai_error_type`
- `mirai_error_type` is only present on async refresh failures

### Browser cookie/WebCrypto error

#### Event: `audit_browser_cookie_error`

- When: the browser reports it could not set/read the module cookie or WebCrypto is unavailable
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `reason`, `url_protocol`
- Notes: This typically indicates that third-party cookies are blocked, all cookies are disabled, or the WebCrypto API is unavailable in the environment (e.g., very old browsers or restrictive embedded webviews).

### Invalid browser token

#### Event: `audit_invalid_browser_token`

- When: the module receives an invalid `shinyOAuth_sid` value from the browser and requests regeneration
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `reason`, `length`

### Token refresh

#### Event: `audit_token_refresh`

- When: `refresh_token()` successfully refreshes the access token
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `refresh_token_rotated`, `new_expires_at`, `expires_in_synthesized`
- `expires_in_synthesized` (logical): `TRUE` when the refresh response did not include a usable `expires_in` value and the package fell back to `resolve_missing_expires_in()`

### Userinfo fetch

#### Event: `audit_userinfo`

- When: `get_userinfo()` is called to retrieve user information (emitted on success and various failure modes)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `sub_digest`, `status`
- `status` values:
	- `"ok"` – userinfo successfully parsed
	- `"parse_error"` – response could not be parsed as JSON or JWT. Additional fields: `http_status`, `url`, `content_type`, `body_digest`
	- `"userinfo_missing_sub"` – OIDC userinfo response was parsed but omitted the required `sub` claim
	- `"userinfo_not_jwt"` – signed JWT required but response was not `application/jwt`. Additional fields: `content_type`
	- `"userinfo_jwt_encrypted"` – userinfo response was a JWE, which 'shinyOAuth' does not decrypt
	- `"userinfo_jwt_header_parse_failed"` – JWT header could not be parsed
	- `"userinfo_jwt_header_invalid"` – JWT header parsed but was malformed or structurally invalid
	- `"userinfo_jwt_typ_invalid"` – JWT header `typ` did not indicate a JWT
	- `"userinfo_jwt_unsigned"` – JWT uses `alg=none`. Additional fields: `jwt_alg`
	- `"userinfo_jwt_alg_rejected"` – JWT algorithm not in provider's allowed asymmetric algorithms. Additional fields: `jwt_alg`
	- `"userinfo_jwt_no_issuer"` – provider issuer not configured for JWKS verification
	- `"userinfo_jwt_jwks_fetch_failed"` – JWKS fetch failed during signature verification
	- `"userinfo_jwt_signature_invalid"` – signature verification failed against candidate JWKS keys
	- `"userinfo_jwt_no_matching_key"` – provider JWKS had no compatible key for the JWT
	- `"userinfo_jwt_payload_parse_failed"` – JWT payload could not be parsed as JSON
	- `"userinfo_jwt_missing_sub"`, `"userinfo_jwt_missing_iss"`, `"userinfo_jwt_missing_aud"` – signed JWT omitted a required claim
	- `"userinfo_jwt_iss_mismatch"`, `"userinfo_jwt_aud_mismatch"` – signed JWT claims did not match the configured issuer/client
	- `"userinfo_jwt_missing_required_temporal_claims"` – signed JWT omitted required temporal claims such as `exp` or `iat`
	- `"userinfo_jwt_invalid_exp"`, `"userinfo_jwt_invalid_iat"`, `"userinfo_jwt_invalid_nbf"` – temporal claim was present but not a single usable numeric value
	- `"userinfo_jwt_expired"`, `"userinfo_jwt_iat_future"`, `"userinfo_jwt_nbf_future"` – temporal claim failed time validation

### State parsing failures

State parsing failures occur while decoding and validating the encrypted wrapper prior to extracting the logical state value, and also when deriving a cache key from a malformed logical state string.

#### Event: `audit_state_parse_failure`

- When: the encrypted state wrapper or its components fail validation/decoding, or cache-key derivation receives an invalid logical state string
- Context: includes `phase` (`decrypt` or `cache_key`), a `reason` code, and either `token_digest` (`phase = decrypt`) or `state_digest` (`phase = cache_key`), plus any additional details (such as lengths). Emitted best-effort from parsing utilities and never interferes with control flow.

### Error response state consumption

When the provider returns an error response (e.g., `access_denied`) but includes the `state` parameter, the module waits for the browser token, consumes the state to prevent replay and clean up the store, and then verifies the browser-token binding before surfacing the provider error. Browser-token mismatches are reported via `audit_callback_validation_failed` with `phase = "browser_token_validation"`; the events below cover the state-consumption portion of that flow.

#### Event: `audit_error_state_consumed`

- When: state from an error response is successfully consumed
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`

#### Event: `audit_error_state_consumption_failed`

- When: consumption of state from an error response fails
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `state_digest`, `error_class`, `error_message`

Digest note: when the callback `state` can be decrypted, these events use the
logical plaintext state digest so they correlate with `audit_redirect_issued`
and the normal callback validation/store events. If decryption fails, the
digest falls back to the encrypted callback payload because the logical state is
unknown.

### Module/session lifecycle

#### Event: `audit_session_started`

- When: the authentication module (`oauth_module_server()`) is initialized for a Shiny session
- Context: `module_id`, `ns_prefix`, `client_provider`, `client_issuer`, `client_id_digest`, plus the standard `shiny_session` context described above

#### Event: `audit_session_ended`

- When: a Shiny session ends (always emitted by `onSessionEnded`, regardless of configuration)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `was_authenticated`

#### Event: `audit_session_ended_revoke`

- When: a Shiny session ends with `revoke_on_session_end = TRUE` and a token was present
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`; the actual revocation attempt is logged separately as `audit_token_revocation` events

### Authentication state changes

#### Event: `audit_authenticated_changed`

- When: the `$authenticated` reactive value changes (TRUE ↔ FALSE)
- Context: `provider`, `issuer`, `client_id_digest`, `authenticated`, `previous_authenticated`, `reason`
- Reasons include: `login` (when becoming authenticated), or the error code/state that caused de-authentication (e.g., `token_expired`, `logged_out`, `token_cleared`)

### Error events

In addition to the `audit_*` events above, the hook also receives error events
emitted just before the package raises an R error condition. These let you log
failures to the same sink as audit events.

#### Event: `error`

- When: a package error is raised via one of the specialized `err_*()` helpers
  (state validation, PKCE, token, ID token, userinfo, configuration, input, parse errors)
- Fields:
	- `type` (`"error"`), `trace_id`, `message`,
  - Plus any `context` fields  from the call site (typically `provider`, `issuer`,
  `client_id_digest`, `phase`, `error_class`)

#### Event: `http_error`

- When: an outbound HTTP request to a provider endpoint returns a non-success status
- Fields:
	- `type` (`"http_error"`), `trace_id`, `message`
	- `status`: HTTP status code (integer, or `NA` if unavailable)
	- `url`: the request URL
	- `body_digest`: SHA-256 hex digest of the response body (for correlation without leaking content)
	- `oauth_error`, `oauth_error_uri`: RFC 6749 §5.2 structured error fields extracted
	  from JSON error responses (e.g., from the token endpoint)
	- `oauth_error_description`: included only when
	  `options(shinyOAuth.expose_error_body = TRUE)` is enabled for debugging,
	  because provider-controlled text can contain request-specific details
	- Plus any `context` fields from the call site

#### Event: `transport_error`

- When: an outbound HTTP request fails before receiving a response (DNS failure,
  timeout, connection reset, etc.)
- Fields:
  - `type` (`"transport_error"`), `trace_id`, `message`
  - Plus any `context` fields from the call site
